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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DARWIN J. THOMPSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20020144-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter under Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-
3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Was the evidence insufficient to support a bindover for trial and did the Trial Court 
properly dismiss the Information against Thompson because the prosecution could not 
establish probable cause that Thompson retaliated against a witness or informant? The 
standard of review is: "The ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over for a trial 
presents a question of law," State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425,429 (Utah App. 1997), which 
is reviewed "without deference to the court below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,18, 20 P.3d 
300. This issue was preserved by the magistrate's order dismissing the charges (R. 23-25; 
35:28-30). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statute is relevant to the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. 76-8-508. Tampering with witness - Retaliation against witness or 
informant - Bribery - Communicating a threat. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another 
as a witness or informant 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Darwin Thompson was charged by Information filed in the Fourth Judicial Court on 
or about October 26, 2001, with Tampering With a Witness, a third degree felony, in 
violation of §76-8-508(2) Utah Code Annotated (R. 1). ~ > 
A preliminary hearing regarding the charge was held on January 10, 2002 (R. 20). 
The trial Court found that the State failed to carry its burden to show^that Thompson's act 
was in retaliation for anything done by the victim as a witness or informant and dismissed 
the charge (R. 23-4; 35: 29-20). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 23, 2001, Suzanne Christenson and Richard Cook attended a church-
sponsored dance together at Utah Valley State College (R. 35: 5,18-19). Between 300 and 
400 people were in attendance (R. 35: 6). Christenson testified that she saw Darwin 
Thompson at the dance (R. 35: 8, 13). Christenson and Thompson were dating several 
years prior to the alleged incident (R. 35: 5). 
At one point during the dance, someone pushed Christenson from behind and "she 
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lost her balance and fell" into Cook (R. 35: 8, 21). Christenson and Cook had been talking 
"on the edge of the dance floor" (R. 35: 20). After Cook helped Christenson regain her 
balance, she looked back and saw Thompson walk by and said, "Oh my gosh, it's Darwin" 
(R. 35: 7, 19-20). 
Neither Cook nor Christenson saw who pushed her (R. 35: 8, 22). Only after 
Christenson was pushed did she turn around and see Thompson nearby with a dance 
partner (R. 35: 8). Nothing was said between Christenson and Thompson, nor was there 
any eye contact as Thompson's back was to Christenson (R. 35:17). Cook testified that he 
and Christenson had been about two or three feet apart while talking (R. 35: 20). There 
were other people around them, at least six to ten people within a five-foot radius (R. 35: 
8 , 2 4 ) . , / ' • • : . • : - , 
Christenson did not report the alleged incident until two months later when an officer 
encouraged her to file a report (R. 35: 14). Before the alleged incident, Christenson was 
involved in a civil law suit with Thompson (R. 35: 9). At the time of the alleged incident, 
the civil suit had been resolved (R. 35: 9-10). Christenson was also the named victim in a 
criminal case involving Thompson (R. 35: 5,10). The criminal case was still pending and 
Christenson was under subpoena to testify for the state (R. 35: 11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly found that the prosecution produced insufficient evidence to 
bind Thompson over for trial. The prosecution could only speculate that Thompson 
committed the offense described in the information. First, Christensen was bumped while 
at a dance, where between 300 or 400 people attended. No one saw who actually bumped 
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into Christensen. Thus, it is impossible to conclude that someone intentionally bumped into 
Christensen. Second, the prosecution could only speculate that Thomson was the individual 
that bumped into Christensen. Thompson was one of at least eight other people that were 
nearby when someone bumped into Christensen. Again, no one, not even Christensen saw 
who actually bumped into her. Thus, there is no reason to believe that one of the other 
people nearby actually bumped into Christensen instead of Thompson. Third, the 
prosecution can only speculate that Thompson bumped into Christensen because of a desire 
to retaliate against her for being a witness or informant against him. There is no reason to 
assume that someone will retaliate against another just because of legal proceedings. The 
prosecution failed to show that Thompson threatened Christensen prior to the alleged 
incident. In fact, the facts indicate that Thompson did not even look at or communicate a 
threat to Christensen. The prosecution must rely solely on speculation while there are 
numerous reasonable inferences that support that someone else accidentally bumped into 
Christensen. The trial Court's ruling should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAGISTRATE CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE STATE PRODUCED INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO BIND THOMPSON OVER FOR TRIAL AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show "probable cause' at a 
preliminary hearing by 'presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it/" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
*[10, 20 P.2d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 1995)). "To prevail 
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at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must . . . produce believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged." Clark, 2001 UT 9, 115 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a 
bindover is the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant; however, in a pragmatic sense, 
"the State still has a higher bar at the preliminary hearing stage than at the arrest warrant 
stage." Id. at 116, note 3. Thus, "the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support 
a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed 
it." Id. at 116. 
In State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, the Utah Supreme Court considered two separate cases 
with very similar factual backgrounds. Both defendants were charged with forgery for 
attempting to cash checks that had been reported stolen only hours previously. Id. at 11. 
In both situations, after the bank did not readily comply, the defendants left the checks and 
exited the bank. Id. In each case, the defendants were bound over for trial, but the 
bindover orders were subsequently quashed by the district court on the grounds that the 
State failed to demonstrate that the defendants acted with the requisite intent under the 
forgery statute. Id. at 118. 
The Court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and 
determined that because both defendants attempted to cash forged checks just "hours after 
those checks were reported stolen," and because the defendants both left the bank and the 
forged checks after the bank took too much time to approve the checks, "the facts give rise 
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to two alternative inferences." Id. at •119-20. 
The Court found that one could conclude either the defendants were unaware that 
the checks had been stolen or "one could reasonably infer an intent to defraud." Id. at ^ 20. 
The Court considered the first alternative and found that it was unreasonable because if the 
defendants were holders in due course, then either they would have waited for the check 
to clear or they would have taken the check with them to "take that up with the account 
holder." Id. Considering the timing of the attempted transaction and the reasonable 
inference that the defendants had to know they were defrauding someone, the Supreme 
Court found that the state had shown probable cause. Id. 
Unlike Clark, where the only reasonable inferences supported the charges, the case 
at bar is not based upon such reasonable inferences; it is based solely upon speculation. In 
fact, the prosecution's assertion that Thompson bumped Christensen in retaliation for her 
being a witness or informant against him is based solely on speculation. The only 
reasonable inferences support the conclusion that Thompson did not bump Christensen in 
retaliation for her part in the court proceedings. 
First, the prosecution speculates that someone intentionally bumped into Christensen. 
It is more likely that someone accidentally or inadvertendy bumped into Christensen. The 
alleged incident occurred at a dance, with about 300 or 400 people in attendance (R. 35: 
6). Christensen and Cook were "on the edge of the dance floor" (R. 35: 20). It is nearly 
impossible to be at a dance without bumping into someone, especially if it is a normal dance 
atmosphere. It is highly possible that another dancer or someone walking by not paying 
attention bumped into Christensen accidentally. 
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Second, the prosecution speculates that Thompson was the one that bumped into 
Christensen. If Thompson was near Christensen when someone bumped into her, he was 
only one of at least eight other people nearby (R. 35: 8, 24). Furthermore, neither 
Christensen nor Cook saw who bumped into her and there is no reason to believe that it was 
Thompson and not one of the other people that actually bumped into her. Even if 
Thompson did bump into Christensen, which the defense does not concede, it was more 
likely an accident. After Christensen lost her balance from the bump, she looked back and 
saw Thompson with his dance partner (R. 35: 8). So whoever bumped into Christensen, it 
was as likely an accidental contact due to dancing or just not paying attention. 
Third, the prosecution speculates that because Thompson and Christensen had prior 
court proceedings against one another, he bumped into her in retaliation for her being a 
witness or informant against him (R. 35: 9-11). There is no evidence to support this 
conclusion. The fact that two people are involved in a court proceeding does not mean that 
one is bound to assault the other. All the reasonable inferences suggest otherwise. Prior to 
the alleged incident, Thompson never threatened or retaliated against Christensen in any 
manner. And at the dance the night the alleged incident occurred, Thompson did not make 
eye contact with Christensen, nor did he communicate any form of a threat to her. 
All of the prosecution's evidence only supports a long string of speculation that does 
not satisfy the probable cause standard established in Clark. While Clark states that the 
evidence is to be viewed in the "light most favorable to the prosecution" and courts "must 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution," 2001 UT 9, •flO, this certainly 
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does not encompass speculation. Speculation stacked on speculation does not make an 
inference reasonable. The probable cause standard is not: "to bind a defendant over for 
trial, the State must only speculate that defendant committed a crime." Fortunately, our 
Constitution provides greater safeguards than this. The prosecution must at least present 
"sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it," and reasonable evidence that the defendant committed "all the 
elements of the crime." See Clark, 2001 UT 9, Ys 10, 15, 16. 
Not only is the prosecution's evidence speculative at most, the prosecution could not 
show probable cause of all the elements of the crime charged. The prosecution did not show 
probable cause that Christensen was assaulted. It is more likely that whoever bumped 
Christensen did so accidentally. Looking at all the evidence and considering that the bump 
occurred at a dance, it is reasonable to conclude that someone accidentally bumped her 
while dancing or just not watching where they were going. 
The prosecution also did not show probable cause that Thompson intentionally 
bumped Christensen in retaliation for being a witness or informant. The prosecution could 
only speculate, drawing upon a very unlikely chain of events that Thompson committed the 
offense charged. 
This Court should affirm the trial Court's order refusing to bindover Thompson for 
trial because the prosecution failed to show probable cause that Thompson violated § 76-8-
508, Utah Code Annotated. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Darwin Thompson asks this Court to affirm the trial 
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Court's factual findings and conclusions of law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _JJoksy of September, 2002. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
GARYH. WEIGHT O 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann., §76-8-508 
Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-3(2)(e) 
10 
76-8-506 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 358 
established solely through contradiction by the testimony of a 
single witness. 
(2) In prosecutions for violation of Subsection 76-8-502(2) or 
76-8-503(lXb), it need not be alleged or proved which of the 
statements are false but only that one or the other is false and 
not believed by the defendant to be true. 
(3) It is not a defense to a charge under this part that the 
oath or affirmation was administered or taken in an irregular 
manner. 1997 
76-8-506. Providing false information to peace officers, 
government agencies, or specified profession-
als. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(1) knowingly gives or causes to be given false informa-
tion to any peace officer with a purpose of inducing the 
officer to believe that another has committed an offense; 
or 
(2) knowingly gives or causes to be given to any peace 
officer, any state or local government agency or personnel, 
or to any person licensed in this state to practice social 
work, psychology, or marriage and family therapy, infor-
mation concerning the com mission of an offense, knowing 
that the offense did not occur or knowing that he has no 
information relating to the offense or danger. . 1998 
76-8-507. False personal information to peace officer. 
(1) A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent 
of misleading a peace officer as to the person's identity, birth 
date, or place of residence, the person knowingly gives a false 
name, birth date, or address to a peace officer in the lawful 
discharge of the peace officer's official duties. 
(2) A person commits a class A misdemeanor if, with the 
intent of leading a peace officer to believe that the person is 
another actual person, he gives the name, birth date, or 
¥
 address of another person to a peace officer acting in the 
lawful discharge of the peace officer's official duties. 2002 
76-S-508. Tampering with witness — Retaliation 
" against witness or informant — Bribery — 
Communicating a threat 
(1)A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing 
that, an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about 
to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a 
person to: 
- (a) testify or inform falsely, 
'•.--•- (b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or 
item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evi-
dence; or -
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation 
- - to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for any-
thing done by another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in 
consideration of his doing any of the acts specified under 
Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reason-
able person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury 
to the person, because of any act performed or to'be 
performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or 
informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 2000 
76-8-508*5. Tampering with juror — Retaliation 
against juror — Penalty. 
(1) As used in this section ^juror" means a person: 
(a) summoned for jury duty; or 
Cb) serving as or having served as a juror or alternate 
juror in any court or as a juror on any grand jury of the 
state. 
(2) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if he 
attempts to or actually influences a juror in the discharge of 
the juror's service by: 
(a) communicating with the juror by any means, di-
rectly or indirectly, except for attorneys in lawful dis-
charge of their duties in open court; 
(b) offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer any ben-
efit upon the juror, or 
(c) communicating to the juror a threat that a reason-
able person would believe to be a threat to injure: 
(i) the juror's person or property; or 
(ii) the person or property of any other person in 
whose welfare the juror is interested. 
(3) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if he 
commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by 
the juror in the discharge of the juror's service: 
(a) to the juror's person or property; or 
(b) to the person or property of any other person in 
whose welfare the juror is interested. 
(4) Tampering with a juror is a third degree felony. 1992 
76-8-509. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal pro-
ceeding. 
(1) A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if by 
the use of force or by any threat which would constitute a 
means of committing the crime of theft by extortion under this 
code, if the threat were employed to obtain property, or by 
promise of any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts to 
induce an alleged victim of a crime to secure the dismissal of 
or to prevent the filing of a criminal complaint, indictment, or 
information. 
(2) "Victim," as used in this section, includes a child or other 
person under the care or custody of a parent or guardian." / 
1978 
76-8-510. Repealed. 2001 
76-8-511. Falsification or alteration of government 
- . record. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(1) Knowingly makes a false entry in or false alteration 
of anything belonging to, received, or kept by the govern-
ment for information or record, or required by law to be 
kept for information of the government; or 
(2) Presents or uses anything knowing it to be false and 
with a purpose that it be taken as a genuine part of 
information or records referred to in (1); or 
• (3) Intentionally and unlawfully destroys, conceals, or 
otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any^such 
. .thing. ^ 197S 
76-8-512. Impersonation of officer. 
- A person is guilty of a class 8 misdemeanor who: 
(1) impersonates a public servant or. a peace officer 
with intent to deceive another or with intent to induce 
another to submit to his pretended official authority or to 
rely upon his pretended official act; 
• '. (2) falsely states he is a public servant or a peace officer 
with intent to deceive another or to induce another to 
submit to his pretended official authority or to rely upon 
his pretended official act; or 
(3) displays or possesses without authority any badge, 
identification card, other form of identification, any re-
straint device, or the uniform of any state or local govern-
mental entity, or a reasonable facsimile of any of these 
° items, with the intent to deceive another or with the 
intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official 
authority or to rely upon his pretended official act. 1991 
76-8-513. False judicial or official notice. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor who, with a 
purpose to procure the compliance of another with a request 
529 JUDICIAL CODE -78-2a-6 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
;
 (3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
'
:
 and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
'' (1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
•"•• crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
*'• (a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
>• adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons, who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 2001 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court, 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. - 196$ 
7S-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected 
records and information — Governmental im-
munity. 
(1) Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted pur-
suant to Subsection 63-2-201(3 Xb), information and records 
relating to any matter on appeal received or generated by the 
Chief Appellate Mediator or other staff of the Appellate 
Mediation Office as a result of any party's participation or lack 
of participation in the settlement program shall be main-
tained as protected records pursuant to Subsections 6*3-2-
304(16), (17), (18), and (33). 
(2) In addition to the access restrictions on protected 
records provided in Section 63-2-202, the information and 
records may not be disclosed to judges, staff, or employees of 
any court of this state. . 
(3) The Chief Appellate Mediator may disclose statistical 
and other demographic information as may be necessary and 
useful to report on the status and to allow supervision and 
oversight of the Appellate Mediation Office. 
(4) When acting as mediators, the Chief Appellate Mediator 
and other professional staff of the Appellate Mediation Office 
shall be immune from liability pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
(5) Pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4S 
the Supreme Court may exercise overall supervision of the 
Appellate Mediation Office as part of the appellate process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities — Staff— Budget. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. ;_• • 
78-3-14.2. District court case management. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
